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Introduction
For every phenomenon, however complex, someone wil eventually come up with
a simple and elegant theory. This theory wil be wrong.
- Rothchilds Rule
One of the problems which confronts us as anthropologists is the question of
cultural relativism - how do we know not only other Minds but other notions of
the world which we inhabit? I am here in particular trying to focus on one aspect
of this problem, namely how we come perceive the natural environment differently
and to what degree we can gain information about the life world of others. Early
this century the theory of cultural relativism replaced evolutionism as the dominant
intellectual force and marked the beginning of modem social anthropology. Since
Franz Boas, the central idea in anthropology has been that we can generalise
across culturesand relativism is 'basically a doctrine in the theory of knowledge:
it asserts that there is no unique truth, no unique objective reality' (Gellner 1982:
183). Recently, there has been explicit attempts to revise what we could term the
'relativist paradigm' in the study of environmental perceptions and the privileging
of our own ontology in our depiction of the life world of others. This essay builds
primarilyon a selection of recent artic1es by Tim Ingold (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996)
where he develops his alternative to cultural relativism; the 'ontology of dwellng'
(1996: 121). Ingold raises a number of issues in these artic1es, but in this essay I
focus on the two found to be most important: the dissolution of the Cartesian
Nature-Culture dualism and the problem of cultural relativism. I wil first give a
short historical introduction to the problem of how to understand perceptions of
the environment, then outline Ingolds alternative paradigm. Finally, I wil discuss
to what degree Ingold succeeds in overcornng the realist versus relativist
positions.
The perceived environment
Going back to Malinowski anthropologists have sought to 'grasp the native's point
of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world' (1922: 25).1 The
understanding that we perceive the world differently, what we might call
perceptional relativism, is very widespread (Chapman 1985: 223). The common
or conventional explanation for this is that culture is a grid which either 'colours'
(weak) or 'determines' (strong) aur perception of 'Nature', what we in everyday
language more often call 'the environment'. If we provisionally accept that the
way we perceive the environment is conditioned by culture then, fundamentally,
our understanding must be rooted in our conceptualization of the world, in other
As Leach (1982: 29) has observed, in his insistence on 'understand(ing) the nature of man
rather than human society. .(...). Malinowski was quite un-Durkheimian'.
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words it must relate to language (cf. Saussure's distinetion between la langue and
parole). In order to study the variation in how the environment is constituted,
anthropologists therefore first turned to linguistics and ethno-semantics (cf. the
distinetion between phoneme and phonetics was used by Marvin Harris to coin the
terms emic and etIc), later to systems of c1assification what became known as the
'ethnoscience' tradition. The goal of ethnoscIence was to use linguistics as a tool
for understanding folk-taxonomies of the environment as perceived by the users
of that environment. One of the earliest examples of this approach is Conklin's
(1969) study of Hanunóo swidden cultivators in Mindaro (Philppines). Whereas
Conklin's study made important contributions to the understanding of swidden
agriculture, it became c1ear that people's actions were not to a large degree
structured by their system of c1assification. Moreover, while the inventory of
native terms underlined the importanee the Hanunóo placed on particular cultigens
and the extent of their cultural knowledge, c1assification did not in a simple and
straightforward way 'strueture' their use of the environment. An early attempt to
advanee the study of environmental perception was Harold Brookfield's artic1e
'On the Environment as Perceived' (1969). In accordance with the idea of
perceptual relativism, Brookfield stressed the importanee of recognizing that it is
the 'perceived' and not 'real' environment which guides peoples' actions.
However, Brookfield was aware of the methodological problems involved, and the
fact that the perceived environment is 'complex, monistic, distorted and
discontinuous, unstable and full of irrelevances' (ibid.: 74). The interest in the
perceived environment was strongly influenced by ethnoscience, but at the time
of Brookfield's aric1e the theoretical emphasis had shifted from linguistics and
c1assification to cognition and behaviour. Nor was it longer believed that
behaviour could be derived from classification as a cultural grammar. As
Brookfield admits, with reference to his own work on land-use among the Chimbu
(Papua New Guinea), it was proximity to their settlement, not intrinsIc land quality
inscribed as indigenous soil c1assifications which decided intensity of land use
(ibid.: 71). In the 1960s the study of the perceived environment was strongly
influenced by the rising prominenee of structuralism, which moved the study of
the perceived environment in a cognitivist direction. In The Savage Mind (1966:
268) Lévi-Strauss abandons Levy-Bruhl's distinetion between 'pre-logic' and
'logic mentality' arguing that 'the savage mind is logicial in the same sense and
fashion as ours'. In its place, Lévi-Strauss formulated an objectified cultural
grammar which, he c1aimed, is universally applicable to all human thinking
(Schweder 1984: 59).2 As a way to approach the world of others the interest now
turne d to cultural categories and cognition (Tambiah 1969) and, especially,
taxonomic anomalies (Douglas 1966). The interest in anomalies (from the point
of the Western observer) can be traced to two sources; the possibility of mapping
cognitive mo dels different from ours and secondly that economic utility was no
2 See also Bateson's (1958: 30) distinction between ethos (emotional structure), eidos (cognitive
structure) and social structure.
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longer found to be an adequate measure of ritual and symbolie importance. We
wil look briefly on one of the better known examples of this approach, namely
Ralph Bulmer's (1967) c1assIc article 'Why is the Cassowary not a Bird?'
In his artic1e on animal c1assification among the Karam in the New Guinea
highlands, Bulmer asks the following question: Why do the Karam not c1assify the
cassowary - a large ostrich-like bird - in the taxon yakt which comprises all birds
and bats known to the Karam, but group the cassowary in the taxon kobtiy? In
other words: 'Why, to the Karam, is the cassowary not a bird?' (ibid.: 5). The
answer to this question Bulmer finds in the interface between the physical
appearance of the cassowary - large, flghtless, bipedal - its ethology, the hunting
taboos associated with it, but more significantly, in the cultural elaboration of the
cassowary's relation to Karam men (ibid.: 18). Myths about the cassowary
suggests, argues Bulmer, that cassowaries are metaphorically seen as 'cross-
cousins' of Karam men. Though the analysis is clearly influenced by structuralism,
Bulmer moves beyond the confines of structuralism 'not so much (because it is)
wrong as inadequate for indicating the significance which certain of these animals
have in Karam thought (ibid.: 9). Though this work is widely regarded as an
exemplar study Bulmer's distinetion between a 'natural' and 'cultural'
classification is unsatisfactory. Bulmer c1aims that 'At the upper leve! of Karam
taxonomy, however, objective biological facts no longer dominate the scene..(..)..
This is the leve! at which culture takes over and determines the selection of
taxonomically significant characters' (ibid.: 6).
As Barnes notes, this means that to 'the extent that Karam taxonomy
corresponds to ours it is intellgible by reference to nature, and to the extent it
does not it is intellgible by reference to culture' (1984: 196). As Barnes correctly
points out, both the taxonomy based on 'objective biological criteria' and the
cultural elaboration of higher order taxa (such as kobtiy) are cultural theories of
how the world is constituted.3 The reason for this confusion, can be traced to the
Cartesian division between Nature and Culture, and the primacy of the Western
ontology, which, it is now argued, has impeded our understanding of other forms
of cultural knowledge.
Cultural relativIsm
The Western separation of Nature from Culture tends to be taken for granted, but
is in reality a dualIsm which can be traced to Descartes and the Enlightenment
(Bruun and Kalland 1995). In Descartes' cosmology there was a rigid separation
of the ideal (Res cogitans) and the material world (Res extensa) (Wilis 1990a:
247). This is reflected in the two counterpoints in an anthropological
understanding of the concept of nature: nature as an objective reality (materialism)
or a category which is meaningful only in relation to culture (idealism) (Hastrup
1989: 16). According to the latter definition it follows that how we perceive of the
3 Keesing has argued that 'folk taxonomies are in large measure artifacts of elicitation
procedures' (1987: 383).
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natural environment to a large extent is dependent on the cultural framework
through which we sift it. The extreme relativist position that not only are cultural
universes different but mutually unintelligible is attributed to the American
linguist-cum-anthropologist Edward Sapir and his former student, Benjamin L.
Whorf (the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). On the basis of Whorfs fieldwork among
Hopi Indians, Sapir argued that 'the worlds in which different societies live are
different worlds and not merely the same world with different labels attached'
(Sapir 1929). This position was later modified by Whorf (1956, in Lukes 1982),
but stil retained the essenee of relativism that people of different cultures live in
different worlds.
Jf we provisionally accept that other people have alternative ways of
understanding their environment, how do we conceptualize this difference? The
conventional approach to this problem is to assume that we all posses or hold
models of how the world ideally is and how it is in reality (whether we all
interpret or scrutinise these models is a different question), a distinetion Geertz
(1973: 93) termed 'model for' (operational model) and 'model of
(representational model, ideology). Another anthropologist, Stephen Gudeman
(1986: 28ff.) suggests distinguishing between 'local' and 'universal models'; the
latter is a formal model meant to portray the world as it 'really is', while the
former is people's own model of their beliefs and practices. Roy Rappaport has
proposed that we distinguish between what he terms 'cognized' and 'operational
models' (1968: 337). The former is a description 'of the environment conceived
by the people who act in it' (ibid.: 238), the latter the anthropologist's construet
based on empirical observation.
Ingold (1992: 48) goes against the dichotomy implied in these models, arguing
that the environment cannot be separately cognized - there is no detached or
disengaged vantage point. Ingold relates this to the problem of how we gain
information about our life-world, that is the link between perception and cognition
(Ingold 1993). Opposed to Brookfield's approach in the 'Environment as
Perceived', Ingold argues that 'culture is not a framework for perceiving the
world, but for interpreting it' (1992: 53). Ingold goes against the idealist or
cognitivist view that 'persons can neither know nor act up on their environments
directly, but only indirectly through the medium of cultural representations' (ibid.:
40). The two most important theoretical influences in Ingold's work come from the
philosopher and semiotician Jacob von Uexküll, especially his concept of Umwelt,
'the world as constituted within the specific life activity of the animal' (Ing ol d
1995: 62), and the ecological psychologist Gibson's concept of affordances, 'what
the environment offers the animal, what it provides and furnishes'. Such
affordances, maintains Gibson, are immediately available to the observer through
'direct perception'. Thus, Gibson reverses the common assumption that our senses
can only provide us with indirect informatÏon of the environment.
There is also another reason for Ingold to advanee Gibson's idea of direct
perception. The conventional idea of indirect information (or perception) assumes
that we learn cultural categories through a proeess of enculteration. This
assumption is tautological, claims Ingold, because if we assurne that internalizing
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culture is a learning proeess, it follows logically that this can only be
accomplished if the actor has already internalized culture and cultural categories.
The only way to escape this tautology is to assume that we gain a direct
perception of the environment by actively engaging with the world.
Having now presented the basis of Ingold's alternative model, we can proceed
to a presentation of his two most important analytical positions: the question of
the Nature-Culture dichotomy and the problem of cultural relativism. The two
arguments are interlinked, but for the sake of c1arity, I wil present them
separately.
The nature-culture dualism
There are two reasons why Ingold advocates abandoning the
Nature-Culture/Mind-Body dualisms. The first is an apparent paradox which
emerges from the assumption that culture structures our perception of the
environment. The second is related to ethnographic practice, and I wil return to
that below. As already described, the conventional or cognitivist assumption is that
culture informs our perception of nature. This means, argues Ingold, that we need
to separate 'really natural nature' , the object of study for natural science, and
'culturally perceived nature', the object of study for social anthropology. This,
however, mandates that we introduce two types of culture: 'real' culture and our
own conception of it. Thus, not only is nature a cultural construet - so is culture.
This paradox can only be sol ved by abandoning the idea that culture structures
environmental perception and instead adopt the notion of direct perception through
engagement.
This leads us to Ingold's concern with our ethnographic practise, where the
conventional Mind-Body dualism imagines Man as half in nature and half in
culture (Ingold 1993). This view is perpetuated despite the fact that a number of
people neither distinguish Culture from Nature, nor entertain a Western
Mind-Body dualism (Strathern 1980). In many cases, neither is the concept nature
a 'basic category', nor are there any concepts which are directly comparable to the
Western concept of nature (Ellen 1996: 118). Thus, Ingold wants us to abolish this
duality both because it hinders an adequate depiction of indigenous practice, and
underpins the idea that culture is a framework for perceiving nature. The antidote
to the disembedding caused by the Nature-Culture and Mind-Body dualisms
Ingold finds in the 'dwellng perspective' (1995: 59), a key concept for Ingold and
one which bridges the different parts of his argument.
The term 'dwellng' Ingold has borrowed from Heidegger's essay 'Building
Dwellng Thinking' written in 1971 (Ingold 1995: 75). The concept of dwelling as
used by Heidegger and Ingold, reverses the ontology of building ~ dwelling.
Instead, dwelling is a now the precursor to building. Dwellng is clearly the root
metaphor for Ingolds reversal of the constructivist paradigm: first, takng up a
view in the world ('dwellng'), secondly, appreciating what the world looks like
from this place ('building'). Cultural construetion or building is therefore to be
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likene d to an epilogue, not as conventional cognitive theory would have it, a
prelude (1992: 52). In the words of Heidegger (op.cit., 160); 'Only if we are
capable of dwellng, only then can we build'.
Translation in a continuous world
We wil now turn to the second of Ingold's concepts, that of 'continuous worlds',
which underpins his critique of cultural relativism and rationality, a debate he
dismisses as 'futile' (1993: 225). Ingold's main analytical point is that what is
conventionally construed as translation is actually an act of 'inversion'. If I
understand Ingold correctly, his argument is that inversion is the proeess whereby
the detached Western observer extracts or decontextualises (or, perhaps better, re-
contextualises) indigenous knowledge or discourse which is fitered through a
Western ontology and then inverted or deflected back again as the picture of this
culture. The proeess of inversion replaces views in the world with views of the
world and from this position it follows that different views of the world are the
result of a variety of cognitive models (Ingold 1993: 224). 'It is the logic of
inversion', argues Ingold, '(that) has set the terms for the never-ending and
singularly futile epistemological debate, between the advocates of rationality and
relativism' (ibid.: 225).
The way to avoid this distortion is to assume that every position is perspectival
and that the world is a 'continuous and unbounded landscape' (ibid.: 226). Rather
than thinking in terms of discrete cultures, Ingold envisages a continuous world
where people take up views in the world and instead of being separate worlds it
is 'the same world viewed from another vantage point within it' (ibid.). The
notion of continuous worlds therefore removes the foundation of the relativist
versus realist positions and, by implication, also dissolves the problem of
translation. The problem of translation is created by the proeess of inversion, and
translation therefore is an 'artificial reconstitution' (ibid.: 230) of a divide or
fragmentation created by inversion. Replacing inversion with the ide a of
continuous worlds therefore removes the problem of 'cross-cultural translation'.
However, as Ingold admits, because 'translation' is sa firmly rooted in the concept
of culture, realizing this goal might ultimately be contingent upon revising our
concept of culture.
Text, context and contextualism
Ingold's work can be read as a critique of the language-centred epistemology
(Eriksen 1992: 27) which has dominated anthropology for half a century. An
example of this privileging of language and classification is the philosopher Barr
Barnes' (1984) claim that learning to conceptualise the world can be envisaged as
a 'Hesse net' (named after the philosopher Mar Hesse), and is characterized by
the twin proeesses of 'ostension' and 'generalization'. Ostension is the proeess
whereby an actor learns a new term by repeatedly being shown the image and the
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accompanying term: 'this is a bird'. Generalization is the proeess where the new
term 'bird' is qualified with statements such as 'all birds can fly', 'birds have
feathers' and requires knowledge of all the sub-c1ass terms such as goose, duck,
swan etc. Full competence, hence, requires a delineation against all other terms in
the dass (ibid.: 188). Thus, takng up a view in the world is similar to learn a
language and tantamount to gain competency or fluency in a pre-defined
c1assificatory system.
Ingold's work is in direct opposition to this textual approach and is also a
rejection of hermeneutics and its separation of text and context (cf. Strathern
1987). Since Ingold rejects the argument that culture is a framework for taking up
a view in the world, this can be seen both a denial of the text-context dichotomy
and a rejection of the problem of translation which is implicit to hermeneutics (as
mentioned earlier, Ingold argues that translation is an artifact of the logic of
inversion). Implicitly, we must assume that Ingold rejects the methodological
problem of understanding 'other minds', what Giddens labels 'double
hermeneuties' (1989: 284). This, however, begs the question, what is 'context for
Ingold? In Ingold's use of the term context figures more often as 'contextualism',
which to Ingold seems to mean situating social life in the act-of-acting, that is as
enskilment or engagement, a view Ingold (1995: 58) grounds in the
phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.
Opposed to Geertz (1973: 14) for whom 'culture is context, the way Ingold
uses the term context it is doser related to 'praxis theory' and its negation of the
separation of action and meaning (Bourdieu 1990). Thus, it is argued that people's
relation to nature cannot be lifted out of its context ('disembedding') because it
is partly this context.4 Ingold's theoretical programme therefore underpins the
contextualist approach (Hornborg 1996: 53) which seeks to situate ecology and
culture within a common framework ('monism' as opposed to 'dualism'). This
monist project was anticipated by Bateson's concept of 'Mind', and his insistence
on the unit y of Mind and Nature (1979), but also to studies which questioned the
universalism of the nature-culture dichotomy (Strathern 1980). The contextualist
position does, however, raise a hast of methodological (and epistemological)
problems, such as if a large part of the environmental knowledge and perception
is embodied, contextual and tacit, how do we describe and analyze it?5 There is
Httle attention to this methodological problem in the works of Ingold, even though
it is of crucial importanee if his model is to become more than a critique of
prevailng orthodoxies in anthropology and human ecology.
4 Ingold also point the fact that we do not interpret everything we sense, and borrowing from
Polanyi (1973) Ingold terms this 'tacit knowledge'. In general, a significant part of people's
knowledge of the environment is tacit, that is experienced or perceived but not interpreted.




The philosopher Brian Fay (1996: 77) distinguishes between epistemological
relativism and ontological relativism. The former asserts that our experiences are
shaped or coloured by and can only be judged from within a particular conceptual
scheme. Ontological relativism, on the other hand, takes this argument a step
further by asserting that by inhabiting different conceptual schemes, people not
only think or experience the world differently - they actually live in different
worlds (ibid.: 80). Even in its weaker epistemological sense, c1aims Fay, relativism
leads to separatism. That is, we end up with the result that cultures as intentional
worlds are mutually unintelligible. In order to salvage the relativist position Fay
suggests some modifications to the relativist stance: a) differenee requires a
background of similarity, b) competing paradigms must be inter-translatable, and
c) our ideas do not constitute our world (as ontological relativism claim). The
alternative position is what Fay calls perspectivism; the view that all knowledge
is situated and perspectival but not mutually unintellgible.6 This position is
strongly contrasted with the one of Ingold. Ingold's strategy is not to try to
reconcile the two positions (realismlrationality vs. relativism) but to remove their
foundation. By arguing for a continuous world, Ingold c1aims not only to have
rephrased the problem of 'other worlds' - he has dissolved it. Take for example
the way in which Fay poses the question: 'Do People in Different Cultures Live
in Different Worlds?' This, however, presupposes that a) cultures are discrete or
discontinuous and b) worlds or worldviews are bounded and culture-specific. None
of the two apply, claims Ingold.
One of the problems with the extreme relativist position was its failure to grasp
that in order for differences to be comprehensible, something must be shared.
Moreover, the extreme relativist position was difficult to maintain because it
undermined the whole enterprise of anthropological inquiry. The common solution
was to assume that we phrase our understanding in different idiomatie expressions.
We understand these expressions either because they are internally valid (within
the society being studied) or because we recognize a common relation, logic or
pattern which is different, but still comparable to our own. The analytical focus
on idioms and idiomatie language is a similar solution; while the concepts being
used are different, they express similar relations between units, what Bateson
referred to as the 'pattern which connects'. For example, Barth mentions that the
Baktaman (Papua New Guinea) put uprooted weeds around their plants because
they believe ltaro likes the smell of rotting vegetation' (1987: 68). Barh interprets
this as an idiomatie statement which Iseems an adequate way to depict a certain
beneficial agronomical technique' (ibid.). However, Barth seems to sidestep the
problem of ontological relativism and instead advocates a praxis approach, that is,
to see such statements embedded in peoples' practice. To clarify it: Barth, as I
6 Perspectivism, however, begs the question 'Whose perspective?' As Lukes (1982: 300) points
too, the most perspective-neutral description of data wil be 'the thinnest, least informative and
socially relevant'.
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understand him, argues that put in its appropriate context the Baktaman share a
conception of ecology comparable to ours. The problem with this solution is that
it may lead to a reification of local knowledge in order to make it comparable to
Western science (Hviding 1996a). Carrier argues that Ponam islanders' (New
Guinea) notions about species ecology differ significantly from Western ecological
science and 'saw their environment in away fundamentally different from that of
Westerners and to different effect (1987: 155). Presenting Ponam knowledge
alongside or as essentially equivalent to Western science is therefore exactly an
example of the re-contextualisation Ingold findsIs typical of inversion.
Classification, history and cognition
It is important to acknowledge that the primacy of our own ontology has always
been the point of departure for social anthropology and the 'lens' through which
we have seen others. What we tend to forget is that our own conceptualization of
the natural world has changed throughout history. Classification is certainly not
unique to traditional or tribal societies, but classification in Modem or Western
societies has received much less attention (but see, Leach 1964; Bouquet 1995).
Classification is also historically contingent and not necessarily fixed once and for
all. Our own system of c1assification is a product of European history, and to a
great extent builds on ideas developed during the Enlightenment, ideas which to
us now seem eminently natural, right and appropriate. Löfgren (1985: 190) quotes
a Swedish sixteenth century zoological survey where the chapter on 'Wild
Animals' has the following headings:
1. About eIks and wild donkeys and their thirst
2. About the medicine one can collect from the right foot of the eIk, and how one
catches the animal
14. About a contributing cause to the expellng of king Christian the Second of
Denmark
16. About otters and their kinds and of forgeries of their furs
17. About squirrels
18. More about squirrels and their abilty to tell the future
Why were these chapter headings considered appropriate and meaningful? One
reason was that the Renaissanee tradition did not make a strict distinetion between
'what is seen and read, between observatIon and relation' (Foucault 1970: 40, in
Löfgren 1985). Löfgren shows how animal categories in Sweden changed with the
rise of an urban bourgeoisie during the seventeenth century. During the eighteenth
century a strictly formal or scientific classification system to ok hold with the
publication of Carl LInnaeus' Systema Naturae (1735). With the entrenchment of
the LInnaean system of classifIcation in Western science, the question is whether
we are able to rid ourselves with it in our presentation of others? To return again
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to Bulmer's cassowar example, Barnes' (1984: 197) argues that Bulmer asked the
wrong question: 'Why is the cassowar not a bird?' is analogous to asking 'Why,
to the British, are kobtiy yakt?'. Thus, Bulmer's mistake was to privilege our own
system of classification, and only from the point of the Western observer is the
classification of the cassowar an anomaly. In order to avoid this category
mistake, Barnes cautions us, Bulmer should have asked 'Why, to the Karam, are
kobtiy not yakt?' or 'Why, to the British, are cassowaries birds?' This, however,
does not solve the problem, because now the objective of cross-cultural translation
is abandoned! Moreover, to the Karam the question'Why is kobtiy not y akt? , is
equally meaningless: it builds on an institutionalized species or classification
theory which cannot be explained because it is a convention or conventional
representation (see, Barnes 1984: 195).
In what ways can Ingold's model be said to overcome these limitations? Ingold
is unclear on how we gain information about our environment, except for the
claim to 'direct perception'. There is no mention of developmental psychology and
very Httle of the role of socialization (but see, Ingold 1993: 221) and the actual
proeess of gaining. information about the world is stil within a black box, a
problem which is not solved simply by labellng it Direct Perception. Despite
Ingold assertions to the contrary, direct perception seems fundamentaHy to be a
mechanism for perceiving the world, not understanding and interpreting it. Ingold
(1993: 220) says that direct perception entaIls 'proeesses of actively and
intentionally attending to the world, of continually adjusting the receptor organs
so as to pick up, from the modulations of the sensory array, information specifying
significant features of the environment'.
The key word here is 'signifIcant'. How does one know what is significant and
how do people agree that some features are more important than others?
Moreover, if perceptual differenee (Le., life-worlds) can no longer be attributed to
cultural difference, why do people living in what is objectively very similar
environments perceive them in different ways?7 The rather lame answer to this
problem must be that the world 'looks' different. This brings us back to the
starting point - in Bateson's terrnnology - which differences make a differenee
(Le., significance)? Ingold never presents an explicit solution to this problem,
except by linking it to the idea of personhood in the works of the philosopher G.
H. Mead. Mead argued that it is exactly because we are continually engaged in
one social world of relationships that we are able to differentiate ourselves from
one another (Ing old 1993: 227). The counter-intuitive argument of Mead and
Ingold is therefore that it is exactly because we live in one continuous world that
both persons and landscapes differ.
Ingold is also unclear about how we learn to attend to the world. He argues that
this proeess is 'akin to the practice of a craft' (ibid.: 221). To me, Ingold's
craftsmanship analogy is not convincing. Craftsmen everywhere work within some
7 The enormous cultural variation among Ok tribes in the New Guinea highlands living in dose
proximity of each other is a case in point (Barh 1987).
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kind of artisanal tradition which, although not entirely binding, do es privilege
some aesthetic vision rooted in a material culture. Moreover, I would maintain,
contra Ingold, that through evolutionary history we have been forced to do the
opposite of 'continually adjusting the receptor organs'. Instead, we have
internalised a specific view of our environment to the degree that it becomes
routinised, exactly because we cannot burden our sensory and mental capacity by
continually trying to fit new sensory data into open-ended categories we 'sink'
them into schemes or scripts which are, if not culture-specific, in some form pre-
conceived or 'prototypes'. Categories and concepts make it possible for us to
make swift judgements of what we see and act accordingly. In general we
therefore need not invest much time and effort in evaluating sensory information;
most of it is filtered away. Only when something resists categorization, like
Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit, do we consciously attend to it. As demonstrated by
recent findings in cognitive anthropology, concepts are constituted before they are
formed into words ('concept first'theory). Moreover, Maurice Bloch (1991: 187)
mentions how Malagasy shifting cultvators have stored a mental model of a
swidden plot which is applied to evaluate the potential for creating a new swidden
in virgin forest. Arriving at a conc1usion of the suitability of a swidden is just a
matter of seconds. The remarkable swiftness of such mental proeessesis, argues
Bloch, a powerful argument against conventional sentence-logic models.
In addition to negate the primacy of classification for perception, Ingold
criticises what he calls 'orthodox culture theory' for its 'obsessive concem with
classification systems' (1992: 47). Re argues that c1assification is not a prerequisite
for understanding the various uses of material objects: a screwdriver can be used
as a lever or a makeshift whisker regardless of how it is 'classified'; the point is
that we recognise the multiple uses of its form; long, pointed, graspable object. I
belIeve Ingold is right that neither is it necessary to classify in order to perceive,
nor is c1assification needed prior to perceiving. However, c1assification does make
communication more efficient because it reduces ambiguity. It is also important
to recognise that classification itself holds important cultural information and, to
some degree, c1assification is this knowledge (consider the Linnaean system of
classification against that of the Karam); it organises people's knowledge and
facilitates transmitting to others. Most importantly , classification establishes what
Marilyn Strathern (1995) terms a relation, it is relationa1.8
This also ties in with how we shall define an environment and the question of
what the environment 'is', its defining features, limits or boundaries and
especially, its relation to us. In his discussion of the 'The Idea of Environment',
Cooper (1992: 169) argues that 'an environment as a mIlIeu is not something a
creature is merely in, but something it has'. To ilustrate this point Cooper uses the
example of a badger lIving near a motorway. Jf the badger is removed to, say, a
laboratory, it becomes confused: it finds itself without an environment. The
8 This insight is not new. In fact, Strathern has borrowed this concept without acknowledging the
intellectual debt to Edmund Leach (1968).
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environment is therefore not simply something it has but something it actively
relates to. Ingold is very c10se to the same ide a when he argues that: 'It may
seem obvious, but is of ten forgotten, that an environment can only be defined
relative to a being or beings whose environment it is' (1986: 2). Like Ingold,
Cooper takes his clue from phenomenology and c1aims that the relation between
an animal and the environment is 'intentional' in the sense that it is 'a field of
meaning or significance' (ibid.: 169).9 This seems to be consistent with Heidegger
description of a person's world as a 'referential totality' (1962, in Cooper 1992:
170).
Continuous but different worlds?
The two key concepts in Ingold'smodel is 'dwellng' and 'continuous worlds'.
The two concepts presuppose one-another; continuous worlds are contingent upon
dwellng and vice versa. However, one might stil ask; in what ways are the two
related? Moreover, in order to argue for continuous worlds, this presupposes
something which is shared. There must be something extending through these
worlds; the question is, what is it? Ingold does not as far as I can see give a
precise answer to this question. Let us therefore recapitulate Ingold's argument one
more time. Conventional approaehes or explanations presume that culture informs
our perception of nature ('constructivism'). Constructivism springs from
cognitivism which privileges the proeesses whereby sensory data are rendered
meaningful by being fitered through some kind of cultural grid (i.e.,
classification). It follows, logically, that we perceive of the natural world
differently because we have different cultures. If Ingold is right that we perceive
of the world as 'affordances' through a proeess of 'direct perception' this has
removed the culture argument. The problem I have with this line of reasoning is
that given that our faculties are the same, why is it that we stil - without culture
- come to perceive, or to use the term Ingold prefers, interpret, the world so
strikingly different?
I cannot see that Ingold gives a definite answer to this problem, except as
mentioned earlier, by taking an analogy from Mead's concept of personhood. This
problem also cannot be sol ved by reference to dwellng or the capacity 'to dwell'.
As Ingold describes dwellng, it is a singular and undifferentiated faculty accorded
to every human being. Secondly, given the premise that nature 'gives itself so to
speak through 'affordances' which are directly and immediately available, and the
world is continuous - why is that we stil come to take up different views or
perspectives of the world? Ingold's answer is that it is related to the character of
place and the 'vista(s) it affords to someone standing there' (1993: 226).
Essentially, this is the same as saying that the world is different because it looks
different. This brings us back to the original problem: why does it 'look' different,
and which differences make a difference?
9 This argument underpins Ingold's (1994, 1995) revision of the humanity-animality dualism.
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Moreover, it is not possible to escape the epistemological problem of 'different
worlds' by locating this differenee in society itself, an argument first put forward
almost one hundred years ago by Durkheim and Mauss in Primitive Classification
(1963). Studying the social origin of human representation of natural categories,
Durkheim and Mauss argued that c1assification was modeled on society and the
first logical categories were social ones. For example, logical hierarchies were
made contingent upon social hierarchy. There were several theoretical deficiencies
in this argument, in addition to the fact that in a number of the cases examined
there were no correspondence between classification and the.form of society.
Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, my brief in this essay has been to reflect on the
problems associated with grasping or fixing people's perception of the
environment. The interest in cognition, first raised by linguistics, is an attempt to
understand how we come to embrace, embody and internalise a paricular vision
of the world in which we live. As Ingold has shown, there is an inherent
contradietion or paradox in the notion that our perception of nature is 'conditioned
by culture'. This critique ties in with a more general attempt to rid oursel ves of the
Culture versus Nature dichotomy which has dominated twentieth century research
in the social sciences. This does not mean that the 'monist project is without its
problems. Jf we assume they do not share our (Cartesian) separation of nature and
culture, how we shall be able to grasp and describe their vision? Anthropologists
have been inc1ined to east this differenee as a model, used as a heuristic tool to
organise 'our' perception from 6theirs'. This approach, however, poses a
delineation problem; are people's perception fundamentally different or only east
in another idiomatic language? There is also the problem of knowing whether the
'native vision' is an artifact of our research methods or a 'true' depiction of their
world view. In short, there is the problem of cross-cultural translation. Ingold
claims that translation, as conventionally construed, is more adequately depicted
as an act of inversion; it re-contextualises (rather than de-contextualises) local
knowledge. Translation, therefore is an artifact of our way of constructing the life
world of others and trying to integrate what epistemological relativism has
fragmented. Ingold's 'ontology of dwellng' challenges the conventional
constructivist position and is the driving force behind the current paradigm shift
in human ecology towards a more emphatic, contextual and praxis oriented
approach (Descola and Pálsson 1996; Hviding 1996b), what Ingold terms the 'new
ecology' (1995: 58).
At the time of its publication, Ralph BuImer's cassowary artic1e was quickly
recognised as a seminal contribution to the field of ethnobiology. Despite minor
quibbles over its representation of Karam classification thirty years later, I believe
Ingold would agree that this study is an example of what Kuhn ca1ls 'exemplars
of successful practice'. Why is this so? The reason is that it raised questions which
went far beyond the confines of ethnobiology, such as what is the nature of
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cultural knowledge. Similarly, Ingold's work, although it can be faulted for
creating min or paradoxes of its own, raises questions about the anthropological
construetion of both 'others' and their 'life world' which has wide ranging
implications outside the narrow field of human ecology. Ingold's attempt to
establish a 'new ecology' can also be interpreted as a critique of the ecosystem
approach in human ecology (Ellen 1982) which despite rejecting the separation of
culture and environment as separate spheres, retained the primacy of a Western
ontology.
Throughout this essay the term relation has continually crept up: peoples'
relation to their environment; nature in relation to culture; the relation between
text and context. In a peculiar and twisted way there is also a relation between
Ingold and Bulmer. One concerning the convergenee of place, another concerning
diverging theoretical roots. In the 1950s Bulmer was part of a British team
working with the Saami in Sweden and Norway. In the 1970s Ingold did his
fieldwork among Skolt Lapps in Finland. In Ingold's work we find a general
scepticism to structuralism and its linguistic roots. As a post-structuralist, Ingold
is primarily concerned with syntagmatic (connective or combinatorial) dimensions.
Bulmer, by comparison, represents the Lévi-Straussian privileging of the
paradigmatie (oppositional or contrastive ) dimension. 10 This place-theory pair
can also be a fitting summary of Ingold's theoretical programme: it attempts to
reconstruct the notion of place, the Continuous World, through a new theory of
practical engagement, the Ontology of Dwellng.
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Summary
Tim Ingold has emerged as perhaps the most interesting
theoretician of Man-Environment relations. This essay
traces the intellectual history of the study of
environmental perceptions and Ingolds rejection of the
notion that culture "informs" our perception of the
environment. Through a critical review of this position the
essay considers the strength - and weaknesses - of Ingolds
theoretical programme, and analyzes the concept
"ontology of dwelling" which signals Ingolds break with
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